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BOOK REVIEW
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND
THE AVAILABILITY OF LEGAL SERVICES
Lawyers for People of Moderate Means,' by Barlow F. Christenson, presents some of the problems of making legal services available to a greater number of people. Mr. Christenson notes that
while the wealthy have no difficulty in obtaining counsel, and legal
services are available to the poor through various legal aid programs, people who are unable to qualify for legal aid but who can
not afford the services of an attorney must go without one. To
remedy this situation Christenson suggests methods to make it economically feasible to provide counsel to these people. He argues
that in many instances the bar has placed its own self-interests
above the public's interest in the greater availability of legal counsel, which raises the old and basic question of the professional responsibility of the bar to the public.
Christenson's approach to the problem of providing attorneys to
people of moderate means is twofold. First, he suggests methods
to increase the efficiency of the private attorney's practice and thus
reduce the cost of legal service. These methods include the greater
use of non-lawyer personnel, a re-evaluation of the restrictions on
solicitation, organizing lawyers into more efficient units, the use
of technological innovations in office management, and specialization by attorneys. Christenson argues that even though specialization
would result in greater efficiency, the concept still encounters much
opposition. Although specialization would present problems regarding qualifications and the regulation of those claiming to be specialists, most of the opposition to the concept has come from the
solo-practitioner and from small general practice firms whose economic interests would be threatened. In Christenson's view arguments based on the economic health of the bar are untenable.
Secondly, Christenson suggests alternatives to the traditional
private practice such as the use of group legal services, better lawyer
referral programs, and experimentation with various types of specialized law offices for people of moderate means. The bar's selfinterests, however, have interferred with its support of these alternatives also.
1 Lawyers for People of Moderate Means, by Barlow F. Christenson;

American Bar Foundation, 1970; xii + 313, paperbound $5.00, clothbound $7.50. For a review which deals specifically with the author's
proposals, rather than questions of professional responsibility see
Fisch, Book Review, 36 Mo. L. Rzv. 602 (1971).
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The bar's opposition to group legal services 2 is well known,
although various state court and U.S. Supreme Court opinions have
upheld the concept.3 Christenson characterizes this opposition as
a manifestation of the desire to uphold the traditional lawyer-client
relationship, a "highly personal relationship involving elements of
fidelity, confidentiality, individual responsibility, and professional
independence." 4 He argues, however, that restrictions on group
services should be considered in light of "the ability of lawyers to
discharge their primary obligation to the public," 5 and that group
legal services would not interfere with this function.
According to Christenson the lawyer referral services have failed
as a result of the bar's lack of active support. The programs have
had little effect on the price of legal services, have not been used
to insure that clients are sent to competent counsel, and have
reached only a small portion of the people who need attorneys. The
programs began as a response to the demand for group legal
services and have failed because of "the bar's traditional conservatism and resistance to change."6
The author suggests three types of special legal offices for people
of moderate means. The first is a private office which is given a
subsidy and promotional privileges to enable it to operate profitably.
The second and third models also involve private firms, either on
a volunteer basis or under contract with a governmental unit.
Christenson argues that none of these plans is as likely to succeed
as group legal services, and all of them can expect opposition from
the bar because of the competitive advantage afforded some attorneys and the expected reduction of income and the minimum
fees charged by the special offices.
In summary, Lawyers for People of Moderate Means was written
for the practicing bar and not academicians. It was written with
the expressed hope that the legal profession can "come to understand itself better and to apply this understanding to the essential
problem" of increasing the availability of legal services.7 The
author does not suggest innovative alternatives to the traditional
2 See Comment, Are Legal Aid Societies, Lawyer Referral Services and

Group Legal Services Adequate Under the Code of Professional Resibility?, 51 NEB.L. Rsv. 486 (1972).
3 E.g., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
4 B. CmusTENsoN, LAWYERS FOR PEOPLE OF MODERATE MEANS 225 (1970).
5 Id. at 230.
6 Id. at 202.
7 Id. at xiv.
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practices of law, but rather considers previous proposals in light of
their effect on the accessability of lawyers to people of moderate
means. Christenson's words regarding the bar's opposition to specialization can be applied to the opposition of any of the reforms
he suggests. He argues: "[E]conomic self-interest can never be
more than an incidental factor in the bar's decisions about specialization. Opposition to specialization is conscionable only if some
paramount public interest requires that the public be denied its
benefits." 8
The bar's professional responsibility flows not only to individual
clients but to the public as a whole. Furthermore, as Christenson

notes:
[R]egardless of the self-protective walls erected by the profession,
the only sure way to preserve lawyers as effective elements in
society is to see that they remain responsive to society's demands.
Therefore, the interests of the profession.., seem to be best served
by extending and expanding the capacity of lawyers to serve the
public and by increasing the public's use of lawyer's services.9
Stephen H. Lewis '73

8 Id. at 91.
9 Id. at 291.

